Disclaimer: This is a follow up to my previous posts on the philosophy of mind series with Marianne Talbot. I suggest that you read those first to familiarise yourself with the arguments and terminology referenced in this post. Physicalist theories of mind, such as anomalous monism and functionalism, become problematic when considering certain features of… Continue reading Do we really have thoughts and feelings?
Anomalous monism is a theory in the philosophy of mind. The philosopher Donald Davidson argues that mental things must have a physical ontology (that is, must exist as/be part of a physical thing) because only physical things can cause other physical things (see my earlier post on identity theory for a reminder of why this is). Davidson… Continue reading Can mental things cause physical things?
Identity theory can be traced back to the mid sixteen hundreds, when Descartes argued that there is a distinction between physical things (res extensa) and mental things (res cogitans). Descartes argued that physical things and mental things must be ontologically distinct from one another because each has properties that the other not only does not… Continue reading Is the mind the same as the brain?